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FOREWORD
The September 11 attacks against U.S. targets came as a
frightening shock to most Americans who had never previously
heard of Osama Bin Laden or the virulent radicalism associated with
his al Qaeda network. In the tumultuous aftermath of the attacks,
many Americans grasped for explanations as to why these events
occurred and what was to be done about them. Closely-related
queries were why Islamic radicals enjoy a significant amount of
popular sympathy within the Muslim World, and how this trend
can be reversed.
This monograph, by Dr. Alan Richards, addresses the critical
questions involved in understanding and coping with the roots of
Islamic radicalism. His work closely examines the links between
radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in
the Islamic World. The result is a thoughtful and probing study
including policy recommendations for U.S. military and civilian
decisionmakers that makes intelligible the complex subject of Islamic
radicalism.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a contribution to the national security debate on this important
subject. This analysis should be particularly valuable to U.S. military
strategic leaders as they seek to better understand the security
concerns of friendly states within the Islamic World. Additionally,
the background information provided should be very useful to all
those involved in military-to-military interactions within the Islamic
World.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Why do “Islamic radicals” enjoy so much sympathy in the
Middle East and wider Muslim world? The author argues that
such radicalism is a political response to the deepening economic,
social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim World. Rapid
demographic growth, educational changes, government policy
failure, and rapid urbanization are among the causes of high
unemployment, and increasing poverty, which, together with other
other forces, have alienated large sectors of Muslim youth. The
regional crisis has deep historical roots, and simple “solutions” do
not exist. A long-term strategy is needed. Elements of that strategy
include recognition of the limits of American power in the face of
this multidimensional crisis, concrete steps to resolve the Palestinian
problem, and improved intelligence cooperation and covert actions.
The future of the region belongs to young Muslims: we should ask
of any proposed policy: how will they interpret our actions?
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROOTS OF RADICALISM?
TOWARDS EXPLAINING THE APPEAL
OF ISLAMIC RADICALS
Introduction: The Debate Over “Roots.”1
Why do “Islamic radicals”―including the partisans of alQaeda and other followers of Osama bin Laden―enjoy so much
sympathy in the Middle East and wider Muslim world? Obviously,
understanding such a phenomenon is a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for crafting a strategy to cope with the murderous violence
of September 11, 2001. Some analysts―including this one―believe
that explaining this―or any other―large-scale social movement
requires a nuanced, complex historical analysis of social, economic,
political, and cultural factors. Space and professional competence
sharply constrain the analysis offered here, which will focus more
on economic, social, and political factors than on cultural and
ideological aspects.
Any reader of journals and op-ed pages of newspapers
knows, however, that perspectives such as this have hardly gone
unchallenged. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of September 11,
attempts at analysis of any kind were often denigrated as symptoms
of cowardice or treason. Pundits and policymakers suggested that
to argue that phenomenon such as al-Qaeda had social roots was to
excuse, or even condone, their apocalyptic actions. As the political
scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon pointed out, such arguments are
“grade-school non sequiturs.”2 After all, historians who study
Nazism do not justify Auschwitz, and students of Stalinism do not
exonerate the perpetrators of the Gulag. Understanding is simply
better than the alternative, which is incomprehension. If we fail to
grasp the forces behind the attacks of September 11, we will fail to
respond wisely.
A charitable interpretation of such breathless anathemas would
be that the authors were simply traumatized by the shock of the
events of that terrible day. While this may well be true, I think that
something else is also involved. The title to this monograph has a
question mark, not because I think that there are not such roots, but
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because there exists an influential school of writers and thinkers who
continue to argue that such roots do not exist. One can distinguish
two broad types of arguments here: 1) arguments about specific
roots (i.e., the debate on the role, if any, of poverty in fostering
Islamic radicalism―discussed below), and 2) a broader denial of
the idea that terrorism (or crime, or any social pathology) has any
interesting social origins. The first perspective is certainly welcome:
it is always useful, indeed necessary, to challenge and question any
particular historical analysis. Such analysts are, at least, engaging in
reasoned debate and analysis, however one may assess the validity
of their arguments.
The second perspective is, of course, one much beloved by
(grossly misnamed3) neo-conservatives. In their jihad against
“liberalism” and “permissiveness,” they fear that any sociological or
economic explanation for behavior will lead to “softness,” or to an
insufficiently muscular (in this case, military) response. At a deeper
level, they seem either to argue that evil―such as the attacks of
September 11―is itself uncaused, or, following a venerable tradition
that extends back at least to St. Augustine, the product of pride. This
latter perspective is particularly prominent in discussions of the
question, “Why do ‘they’ hate us?” Allegedly, “Muslims” “hate” the
United States because we have been successful, and they have failed.
Such explanations, of course, imply that we in the United States need
not change any significant aspect of our behavior, most particularly
including our energy and foreign policies. We simply have to keep
bashing the miscreants militarily often enough, and then they will
come to understand that we are right and they are wrong. It is, in
essence, an American version of the “Iron Wall” strategy which
Vladimir Jabotinsky advocated for the Yishuv in Palestine.4
Of course, the wrong diagnosis will typically lead to the wrong
prescription. The American version of the Iron Wall is likely to be
no more successful than it has been in Israel, where, 50 years after
the proclamation of the Jewish state, Israeli citizens feel at least as
insecure as ever in their history. While military action, and, even
more, covert operations may well be appropriate elements of a longterm strategy, they are hardly likely to be sufficient. The reason, of
course, is that the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism indeed has
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deep, tangled, historical roots, and that our behavior has, and can
again, exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem.
Part of the difficulty, of course, is the very complexity of the
phenomenon (or phenomena) which confront us. As a number of
excellent recently published articles and books have reminded us
(it is a damning commentary that we needed reminding), Muslims
who deeply dislike various aspects of the international order, their
domestic political system, and/or U.S. foreign policy are a highly
diverse lot.5 Since at least one of seven human beings is Muslim, how
could it be otherwise? This very complexity makes it hugely difficult
to generalize, yet generalize we must if we are to identify courses
of action that are likely to increase, or decrease, our security. It may
also be that the very complexity (and fluidity) of the phenomenon of
“Islamic radicalism” contributes to disagreement about the relative
weight of various social factors, simply because different analysts
are―perhaps unknowingly―discussing different groups of people.
For example, it may be useful to distinguish between the
following groups, thought of (perhaps) as concentric circles:
1. “Jihadist Salafis”―such as the followers of al-Qaeda and likeminded local groups;
2. “Salafis”―those who believe that the imitation of the behavior
of the Prophet’s closest companions should be the basis of
the social order;
3. “Islamists”―a still broader category, which includes anyone
who thinks that the precepts of Islam―however interpreted―
should be fundamental to the political and social order; and,
4. “Discontented Muslims”―people who identify themselves
as Muslims, and who are unhappy with their life prospects,
with the justice of their societies, and/or with the state of the
wider world.
Presumably, the goal of American policy should be to isolate the first
group from all the others. This alone would suggest that understanding
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the social origins of the other groups, and the origins of their
discontents, should be a high priority for Americans. Doing so
requires us to have some understanding of the vast, multidimensional
crisis which is unfolding in the Muslim world.
A Region in Crisis.
The Arab―and the wider Muslim―world confronts today a
multidimensional crisis. Like any important historical phenomenon,
the roots of the current crisis in the Middle East and the Muslim world
are profoundly complex and intertwined. The crisis has economic,
social, political, and cultural dimensions. Although the author
focuses on the socio-economic and political aspects of the crisis, the
cultural difficulties are equally, perhaps uniquely, difficult.
Although these dimensions are conceptually distinct, they are
intimately linked, and they interact in complex ways. For example,
economic failure erodes regimes’ legitimacy and fosters an ideological
vacuum, as old ideas (e.g., Arab nationalism) are understandably
perceived as failures. The often-noted fact that essentially all serious
political discourse in the region is now phrased in Islamic terms
links the cultural dimension to all of the others.
The crisis is simultaneously internal and external. It is internal,
because, as we shall see, population growth, failed economic
policies, and local authoritarianisms (as well as cultural issues
which fall outside of the purview of this monograph) all contribute
to the problem. It is also external: wider forces of globalization play
a critical role in stimulating the growth and spread of radicalism.
Much of the region’s economic stagnation derives from a weak and a
distorted integration into the global economy. At the same time, the
kinds of integration which have occurred―specifically, international
migration and the spread of global communications―have themselves
contributed to the spread of radicalism. The failure of local regimes
is, in large part, a failure to manage and engage successfully the
wider process of globalization.6 Nor can the problems of governance
in the region be understood without reference to outside actors, and
to ongoing international conflicts.
Today’s Middle East finds itself enmired in the “modernization
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process.” For all the well-known weaknesses of this particular optic
on modern history, it remains true that changing from a society
inhabited by illiterate farmers, who are ruled by a literate, urban
elite, into an urban, mass-educated society with an economy based
on industry and services has always and everywhere been deeply
traumatic. Worse, this transition has always and everywhere spawned
grotesque violence. The modern history of both Europe and East
Asia, the only places in the world where this transition has been
more or less successfully accomplished, often reads like a horror
novel: World Wars I and II; Stalin’s Gulag, and Hitler’s Holocaust,
or Japanese fascism, the Chinese revolution, the “Great Leap
Forward” and its attendant famine, and the Cultural Revolution.
American experience has also been bloody: the extermination of
Native Americans, the racial violence of slavery and Jim Crow, and
the more than half-million casualties of our own Civil War. Why
should we expect Middle Easterners to do better than Europeans,
Americans, Japanese, or Chinese?
Much of the violence of this transition has been perpetrated
by utopian fanatics, a category which includes fascists, Nazis,
Leninists, and Maoists―and the followers of al-Qaeda. Like their
earlier cousins, today’s Islamist fanatics have “imagined a future,”
in this case the “restoration” of the (imagined) conditions of life in
7th century Arabia. Like all fanatics, they believe that they enjoy a
monopoly on truth, and that those who disagree with them “are not
merely mistaken, but wicked or mad.”7 Like all fanatics, they believe
that there is only one goal for humanity, and they are ready to wade
“through an ocean of blood to the Kingdom of Love.”8 Fanatics have
always built towers of skulls as monuments to their fantasies.
These particularly virulent fanatics are part of a larger social
phenomenon, the transnational “Salafi movement.” This movement
advocates a strict return to the practice of (what they believe to have
been) the practices of the earliest Muslims. Their political ideology
asserts that such a return will constitute a solution to the many
difficult problems facing Middle Eastern and other Muslim societies.
As their slogan goes, “Islam huwwa al-hal”―“Islam (that is, the Salafi
interpretation of Islam) is the solution.” Salafis include the followers
of al-Qaeda―and the muwahhiduun (or “Unitarians”―as they call
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themselves) or the Wahhabis (as others call them), partisans of the
official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Several analysts
have recently called our attention to the spectrum of opinions within
this movement.9
Radical movements have their greatest appeal when the
dislocations of the transitions to modernity are most acute. Only
the slaughter of World War I and its chaotic aftermath allowed
the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia; Hitler is inconceivable
without the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression; famine,
governmental collapse, and the horrors of the Japanese invasion set
the stage for Mao. The Siren Song of fanatics becomes most seductive
when economic, political, social, and cultural crises combine, and
when people feel that they have been repeatedly humiliated. Any
policy which increases the feelings of humiliation of the people of the region
is simply throwing gasoline on the fire.
The Rage of the Young.
The utopian fanaticism of al-Qaeda and other groups is nourished
by the deep despair of huge numbers of young Middle Easterners,
two-thirds of whom are below the age of 30, half of whom are
younger than 20, and 40 percent of whom have yet to reach their
15th birthday. The first major social element in the noxious cocktail
of religious radicalism in the region is the phenomenon of the “youth
bulge.”
The key demographic facts of the region are that the population
is still growing rapidly, but fertility rates have declined considerably
during the past decade.
According to the World Bank, the population of the Middle East
and North Africa is now growing at about 2.1 percent per year. At
this rate, the population will double in about 34 years. On the other
hand, population growth rates have fallen sharply in the past 10
years (from 3.2 percent in the mid-1980s to 2.7 percent in 1990-95 to
2.1 percent in 2001). Sharp fertility declines caused this change; there
are reasons to expect further falls.
This generalization hides substantial variation across countries
and regions. (See Table 1.) Although population growth rates and
total fertility rates have fallen markedly in Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia,
6

they have remained stubbornly high in Gaza and Yemen. Indeed
the total fertility rates in Gaza (7.6) and Yemen (7.1) are among the
highest in the world. The Gazan rate is also very high in relation to
per capita income, a phenomenon which is also observable in the
Arab Gulf countries.
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain

26.8
31.8
.64

Population Growth
Rate (Percent)11
2.5
2.2
1.9

Egypt
Gaza
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan

68.5
1.2
71.9
24.7
4.7
2.1
3.6
6.1
30.2
2.5
41.2

1.9
4.5
2.5
3.6
3.1
1.9
1.6
3.7
2.0
3.3
2.4

3.4
7.6
4.3
6.1
4.8
3.4
2.3
6.2
3.4
6.1
4.9

Qatar
Saudi Arabia

.75
22.2

1.3
3.3

3.5
6.4

Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia

7.0
33.5
17.8
9.6

2.8
2.9
3.2
1.5

7.0
5.7
5.6
2.4

Turkey

66.6

1.6

2.5

2.4

1.6

3.6

1.7
17.5

3.2
3.3

4.9
7.1

UAE
West Bank
Yemen

Population10

TFR12
6.0
3.4
3.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf.

Table 1. Population Data for Selected Middle Eastern
and Other Muslim Countries.
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Populations will continue to grow despite falling fertility rates
because fertility remains well above replacement levels and because
past population growth ensures that many women will soon enter
their child-bearing years (so-called “demographic momentum”).
Many countries of the region will experience considerable additions
to their populations during the coming 15 years. (See Figure 1.) The
population of the region may reach roughly 600 million by 2025,
some six times more people than in the 1950s. Such growth poses
numerous economic challenges, from areas ranging from food and
water to jobs to housing.
Several implications follow from this demographic pattern.
First, and for our purposes, the most important, is that most Middle
Easterners are young: half of all Arabs, 54 percent of all Iranians and
52 percent of Pakistanis are younger than 20 years old. (See Table 2.)
Two-thirds of Saudis are younger than 25, and two-thirds of all the
people of the region are under thirty. (By contrast, only slightly more
than one-quarter of the populations of developed countries―the
United States, Canada, European Union (EU), Australia and New
Zealand (A/NZ), and Japan―are under 20.) As Kepel stresses,13
this age structure first emerged in the 1970s―perhaps not entirely
coincidentally, the same decade as political Islam surged. Note,
however, that this picture will not change markedly in the next
generation: By 2025 the number of people aged 0-14 years will
roughly double; in that year, roughly two out of five Near Easterners
are projected to be younger than 20.14 When we think of questions
such as “what are the impacts of our policies on Arabs?” we are in fact
asking, “what are the impacts of our policies on young people?”
Second, as Williamson and Yousef have argued,15 the rapid fall
in fertility may lead to a rapid decrease in the “dependency ratio”
(the number of people under 15 and over 65 to the working-age
population). When this has happened elsewhere, as in East Asia
in the 1970s and 1980s, dramatic increases in national savings
rates ensued. For Williamson and Yousef, the demographic change
caused the savings change (this is the natural result of their life-cycle
savings model). They are quick to note, however, that whether or not
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9
Figure 1.

Percentage of the population which is:
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Gaza
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
West Bank
Yemen

<15 years old
43 %
38
31
36
52
43
47
43
32
30
48
36
41
34
27
43
44
45
46
32
31
32
45
48

<20 years old
53 %
50
38
47
62
54
58
54
42
41
58
47
51
52
35
52
54
56
57
42
41
41
56
60

19
34

26
43

Developed Countries *
Less Developed Countries
* EU, Japan, U.S., Canada, A/NZ.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf.

Table 2. Youth as Percentage of Total Populations.
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such savings find their way into productive and job-creating
investment depends on many other factors. Nevertheless, in the sea
of “bad news” about the region’s political economy, it is well to be
reminded that not all is bleak.
For the first time in history, many of these youths have received
some education. Although the region lags behind other parts of the
developing world such as Southeast Asia, China, and Latin America,
nevertheless, school enrollments and literacy have risen dramatically
during the past generation. For the first time in history, most Arabs,
and most Iranians, can read and write (this is still not the case in
Pakistan, however, where only just over two-fifths of adults are
literate). As usual, considerable variation exists among countries:
more than three-quarters of adults are literate in Iran and Kuwait,
while adult literacy stands at between one-half and two-thirds in
Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Only about
half, or fewer, of all adults are literate in Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and
Yemen.
But even in a laggard like Egypt, virtually all children are
enrolled in school. School enrollments have exploded throughout
the region. The pattern has been uneven, particularly between
genders. In most countries, boys were in school long before their
sisters were enrolled. Today, however, not only all boys, but all or
nearly all girls are enrolled in primary school in Algeria, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. Roughly 60 percent of all
adolescents are enrolled in secondary school in the region. In Saudi
Arabia, all boys are enrolled in primary school, but only 75 percent
of girls are in school. In the most backward countries, such as Sudan
and Yemen, most girls are still not in school. In Yemen, for example,
although nearly all boys are enrolled in primary school, only 40
percent of girls attend primary school. In Morocco over one-third,
and in Oman roughly one-fourth, of girls are not in primary school.
Despite the appallingly vast waste of human resources which such
under-enrollment of girls represents, the past generation has seen an
educational revolution throughout the region.
Several consequences follow. First, some analysts believe that the
gap between girls’ and boys’ education contributes to the appeal of
Islamists and Salafists.16 In this rather hopeful view, part of the origins
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of political Islamic radicalism, including its relentless focus on rigid
gender segregation, lie in the differential educational levels which
only the current generation will experience. For earlier generations,
both men and women were largely entirely uneducated. And, in the
immediate future (and the future is now in Iran) everyone will be
at least minimally educated. Fargues posits this gap as part of the
explanation for the appeal of the Salafi Islamists today.17
Second, rapidly spreading education is part of the social
background to what the historian Richard Bulliet has called the
“crisis of authority” in Islam.18 How is it, after all, that any engineer
can issue his own fatwa? In previous centuries, such pronouncements
were the exclusive prerogative of a small, relatively privileged elite of
traditionally educated Islamic scholars (the ulama). Today, however,
the widespread diffusion of education joins with the absence of
hierarchical controls on religious edicts in Islam (in contrast to,
say, the situation in Roman Catholicism) to produce the “religious
anarchy” that provides the cultural space for radicals to promulgate
and advocate their messages.
As Gilles Kepel and others (e.g., Richard Bulliet) have argued,
centralizing nationalist states of the 1950s and 1960s contributed to
this problem. Earlier, the semi-independence of the ulema allowed
them to play a mediating role between arbitrary state power and the
populace. Once the ulema were formally incorporated into the state
itself, they lost their mediating role along with their independence.
Consequently, the “social space” of religious criticism of tyranny
was vacated, to be occupied by political Islamists.
Third, the quality of the education received during this explosion
has left much to be desired. Throughout the region, education stresses
rote memorization, with little if any emphasis on analytical thinking
and problem solving. In some countries, much time is devoted to
religious instruction: in Saudi Arabia, 30 to 40 percent of all course
hours are devoted to the study of scripture.19 Expectations have been
raised, but the skills to meet those hopes have not been imparted.
Millions of young men now have enough education to make the
old, difficult, dirty jobs unsatisfying, but haven’t acquired the skills
needed for the modern hyper-competitive global economy.
Fourth, thanks to past population growth, the Middle East has
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the most rapidly growing labor force in the world (3.4 percent per
year, 1990-98). In some countries, the situation is even more serious:
Algeria (4.9 percent), Syria (4.8 percent), Yemen (5.6 percent). By
way of comparison, the labor force in the EU has grown at some
0.4 percent per year during the past decade, while the American
labor force has grown at about 0.8 percent. In other words, the
labor force in the Middle East is growing four times as rapidly as the
American labor force, and eight times as rapidly as the European labor
supply. Although the rate of growth attributable to past population
growth will decelerate in some countries (e.g., Tunisia) during the
next 10-15 years, the decline in fertility is, as always, accompanied
(plausibly, largely caused by) rising female education―which also
and simultaneously leads women to seek to enter the labor market. It
is highly unlikely that the growth of the labor supply will decelerate
within the medium term.
At the same time, the demand for labor has grown sluggishly.
Simple economics tells us that, given such a mismatch between
the growth of demand and supply, either the wage will fall,
unemployment will rise, or (most likely) some combination of both
will occur, with the precise mix varying with specific labor market
structures. Government policies have not only reduced the rate of
growth of the demand for labor, but have also fostered inflexible
labor markets. (See below for more on government economic policy
failure). Decades of government job guarantees for graduates have
induced students to seek any degree, regardless of its utility, since
a degree by itself has long been a guarantee of a government job.
Governments cannot now provide the necessary jobs, but statist
policies impede private sector job creation.
Several generalizations about unemployment in the region may
be made. First, current levels of unemployment are high (see Table
3), and the problem will probably get worse in the near-to-medium
run. In some countries, levels of unemployment are similar to those
seen in the United States only during the worst days of the 1930s.
Unemployment primarily affects young, semi-educated, urban
people, whose anger fuels political unrest. Second, real wages
have stagnated for roughly a generation, and poverty levels have,
depending on the country, either remained roughly the same or
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increased during the past decade. Third, stagnant real wages and
difficulties finding employment greatly stimulate the desire of the
young to leave their country.
Country
Algeria
Egypt

Unemployment Rate
30%
12%

Iran
Jordan

20-25%
15%

Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Saudi Arabia

18%
29%
15 - 22%
14 - 18%

Syria
Tunisia

12 - 15%
16%

Remarks
1999
2000. Some estimates show
20%
2001
Official Rate. CIA gives 25
- 30%. (1999)
1998
2000
2000
Higher among
graduates
1999
1999

Yemen

35%

1999

Sources: Saudi Arabia, United States Embassy, Riyadh, and NYT, 8/26/01: Iran,
Eric Rouleau, Le Monde Diplomatique, www.en.mondediplomatique.fr/2001/06/ 05iran;
all others: MEDEA Institute (European Institute for Research on Mediterranean
and Euro-Arab Co-operation), and CIA World Fact Book.

Table 3. Unemployment in the Middle East:
A Compendium of Estimates.
For decades, international migration has provided a safety-valve
for the pressure on domestic labor markets. Migrants, particularly
North Africans, moved to the EU, while Egyptians, Yemenis, and
Masraqis sought work in the Gulf during the oil boom years. Three
political consequences have ensued.
1. The migrants to Europe, who may have intended to be
“temporary migrants” have tended to stay. Their children, often
called “second-generation migrants” face particularly challenging
problems of education, employment, housing―and identity. It is
14

perhaps unsurprising that quite a number of second-generation
immigrant Muslims in Europe have been attracted to Salafi and
other radical doctrines.
2. Migrants to the Gulf often did return to their home countries,
not only richer, but also more socially conservative, associating
their good fortune with the Wahhabi customs and outlook where
they prospered. The phenomenon even had a name in Egypt: “algulfeyya.”
3. The expulsion of migrants from Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen
during the Gulf Crisis of 1990 embittered many, and imposed serious
costs on their respective national economies.
What is the state of poverty in the region, and what, if any, are its
political consequences? Only sketchy data are available on poverty
from the Middle East News Agency (MENA).20 Existing information
is also quite contradictory, which is hardly surprising. After all,
“poverty” is the modern equivalent of classical political economy’s
“subsistence,” defined as some set of commodities without which
a person or household is thought to be sufficiently deprived as to
be defined as “poor.” Reasonable people differ sharply over the
definition of the “necessary basket of commodities.”
Serious issues also bedevil the selection of an appropriate price
vector to be used in calculating the cost of the basket (e.g., do the
poor actually pay the “national average” price?). Given these
disagreements, it is not surprising that different studies use different
poverty lines. And these difficulties are limited to an estimate for
a single time period. In the MENA region, considerable rainfall
variability and occasional political and economic turmoil make it
difficult to draw conclusions about long-term trends from data for
a few years.
Since the World Development Report of 1990, the World Bank has
used the “$1 PPP” or “$2 PPP” measures of poverty. Data from two
World Bank sources21 suggest that, at the international poverty line
of $1 in expenditure per person per day at 1985 PPP, the poverty
rates are low except for Yemen, a country with one of the lowest
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per-capita income levels in the region. For the six countries covered
by van Eeghen―Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia―
the 1990 aggregate poverty rate was around 6 percent. Using this
measure, poverty in MENA appears to be relatively limited compared
to other regions in the developing world. With a poverty line of $2
the rates jump, an indication that a substantial population share lives
on expenditures between $1 and $2 per person per day. Using the
$2 poverty line, van Eeghen estimates an aggregate poverty rate of
around 25 percent. National poverty lines vary widely; on average
they tend to be closer to the $2 line.
In fact, the Bank’s $1 PPP poverty line, which was designed to
reflect the standards of what it means to be poor in a poor country,
seems too low for most MENA countries. The $1 line is far below
average $PPP per capita incomes for most countries: the ratio of per
capita GNP to the poverty line, both measured in PPP dollars, is
unreasonably high when compared with a similar calculation for the
United States. In the United States, GNI per capita is about 6.5 times
greater than the poverty line, whereas corresponding MENA figures
are Egypt (9.9), Jordan (11.4), Morocco (8.8), and Tunisia (13.8).22 In
addition, there are other problems with the World Bank’s estimates,
perhaps most importantly related to the lack of data that are needed
to construct price indices for the consumption baskets of the poor.
Reddy and Pogge23 find that simulations using alternative PPP
indices can raise estimates of poverty by 25 percent to 100 percent.
From a political perspective, what counts is the relative, social
definition of poverty. Poverty is always and inevitably partly
relative: poor people in Egypt, Jordan, or Algeria (and those who
sympathize with their plight) do not compare themselves with the
poor in Bangladesh or Madagascar; they feel “poor” relative to their
fellow Egyptians, Jordanians, or Algerians. It follows that higher
estimates of poverty are more politically relevant.
While there are disagreements on poverty headcount levels,
something of a consensus is emerging on poverty trends―which
is more relevant from a political perspective. Most analysts24 agree
that aggregate poverty rates in MENA fell during the years of the oil
boom (from the mid 1970s to the early-to-mid 1980s) but started to
rise after that. At the level of individual MENA countries, Adams and
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Page25 (2001) note that Jordanian poverty, which rose precipitously
1988 to 1992, has fallen but still remains higher than in 1988. Other
analysts also find that, despite the decline in Jordanian poverty
from 1992 to 1997, poverty in the latter year “remained far higher
than it was in 1988.”26 Similarly, a Ford Foundation review of the
lively debate over poverty trends in Egypt concludes that there was
a large rise in the poverty headcount from 1981-82 to 1990-91 (from
29.7 percent to 42.4 percent) and that, although the rate of poverty
increase slowed down during the 1990s, by 1995-96 (the last year for
which there are data) the poverty headcount stood at 48 percent of
households.27 A study of poverty in Yemen found that the number
of families suffering from malnutrition rose from 9 percent in 1992 to
27 percent in 1999.28 An International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) report concludes that “the proportion of people living in
poverty appears to be rising in most of the region’s middle and lower
income countries.”29 Finally, some of the countries for which data are
missing―most importantly Iraq and Sudan―have large populations
and relatively high poverty rates (although the exact magnitudes are
not known).
There are other reasons to believe that, despite the difficulties of
definitions and data, the problem of poverty may be worsening in
the region. Ali and Elbadawi30 cite three factors that seem likely to be
the key drivers of the rise in poverty. First, unemployment, despite
measurement difficulties is not only high, but also rising in many
countries. Second, most job creation has occurred in the low-wage
informal sector, not in higher paying formal sector employment.
And finally, there is much evidence of falling real wages in formal
sector urban employment. One might add that in some countries,
including Egypt, real wages in agriculture have been falling as
well.31
What are the political consequences of poverty? Poverty provides
a fertile recruiting ground for opponents of regimes (and therefore
poses a challenge to governance) in at least two ways. First, some
poor people, particularly younger ones with some (often limited)
education, join violent opposition movements. The basic profile for
the rank-and-file of many of today’s violent radical Islamic groups
is a young person with some education, who may also have recently
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moved to the city. Such young people are often unemployed or have
jobs below their expectations. In North Africa, they are colorfully
known as the “hetistes.”32 Some evidence from Egyptian arrest records
suggests that many of those arrested for violent activities against the
regime come from the shanty towns surrounding large cities―that is,
from some of the poorest urban areas of the country. Ahmed Rashid
has recently argued that the rise of Islamist radicalism in Central
Asia is also related to the problems of youth unemployment there.33
Most recently, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, the alliance of
Islamist parties in Pakistan) attracted poor voters because, as one
poor Pakistani who voted for them said, “Nawaz and (Bhutto) just
stole from us, the religious parties come from the poor, and they
will help us.”34 Even if the leadership of these parties do not, in fact,
“come from the poor,” in politics, perceptions are what counts.
The tenacity of violent opposition in Upper Egypt during the
past 2 decades is also plausibly related to poverty. The Sa’id (Middle
and Upper Egypt) is the poorest region in the country. Moreover,
there, as elsewhere in the country, poverty has been rising during
the past 10 years. The poverty situation deteriorated during the past
decade, thanks to the collapse of unskilled wages. These had risen
over 350 percent in real terms from 1973 to 1985, largely thanks
to emigration for work in the Gulf States (public job creation also
played a role). With the collapse of the regional oil industry in the
war-related migration to Iraq, and in the ability of the public sector
to create jobs, wages for unskilled workers fell by over 50 percent.
As Sai’idis increasingly move to cities, they “export” the problem of
Islamism to more visible locations, such as the major cities of Egypt.
The lack of new jobs is particularly acute since the long-run
problem has and in many cases will continue to worsen in the short
run. The demand for labor has grown sluggishly because output
growth has lagged, and also because of specific policy biases against
labor-intensive, job-creating growth. Not only do the statist, inwardlooking policies sketched above retard growth; they also raise the
capital-intensity―and reduce the job-creating impact―of whatever
growth does occur. But changing these policies requires laying off
workers in state-owned enterprises and the bureaucracy, a move
which frightens many leaders.
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Not by Bread Alone.
The employment problem is the most politically volatile economic
issue facing the region during the medium term, as it encourages
many of the relatively educated, young, urban residents to support
radical Islamist political movements. One must be cautious here,
however. The problems of the “youth bulge” and rampant youth
unemployment are at least as severe in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet we
hear little of Congolese international terrorism, for example.35 Many
complex political and cultural forces are behind the various kinds
of Islamist political movements; no “economic determinism” is
implied here. To understand how and why the discontent spawned
by unemployment takes a specific political and ideological form, one
cannot have recourse to demography and economics alone: we must
also look at political structures and ideological environments.
The Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to have said that, “the
revolution is about Islam, not the price of melons.” Much deeper
issues of identity and legitimacy are at stake. For example, we
should remember that although unemployed, frustrated young
men throughout the region can turn to Islamism, they can also turn
to drugs and crime, to apathy, indifference, muddling through,
dogged hard work, or any number of other, personal “coping”
strategies. The decision to join a revolutionary movement is a deeply
personal, idiosyncratic one. Socio-economic contexts are important
for understanding these movements, but they hardly provide a full
explanation for them. Nevertheless, huge numbers of discontented
young men (and women) are a major threat to internal stability
throughout the region.
We might view the importance of youth unemployment in a
different way. Youth politics have always and everywhere focused
not merely on material goods, but also on questions of identity,
justice, and morality. (Consider the politics of American “Boomers”
during the 1960s.) Impatience―and Manichean thinking―are
among the burdens of youth politics, whether in Berkeley or in
Cairo. And, as criminologists tell us, resort to violence is also
overwhelmingly a youth phenomenon. The presence of millions
of un- or underemployed young men, in the specific political and

19

cultural milieux of the region, constitutes one of the tangled roots of
radicalism.
The Jungle of Cities.
The discontent of these young people is exacerbated by the fact
that most of them now live in cities―cities which are crumbling.
The number of urban Middle Easterners has increased by about 100
million in the past 35 years. Roughly half of the population of the
region now lives in cities. The number of urban dwellers is expected
to rise from its current level of over 135 million to over 350 million
by 2025. From 1985 to 1990, the most rapid growth was in secondary
cities―6 percent―compared with a growth rate of 3.8 percent for the
19 largest cities with populations over 1 million in 1990. This trend has
continued during the 1990s. (See Table 4.) Public services and utilities
are already overwhelmed; in Jordan and Morocco, for example, onethird of the urban population lacks adequate sewerage services. Urban
water supplies are often erratic. Governments attempt to provide
urban services through heavy subsidies. These strain government
budgets, and thwart the necessary investments to extend and improve
services.
The rapid urbanization of the region erodes governments’
legitimacy in at least three ways. First, the rapid growth of cities
strains infrastructure―and government budgets. Governments’
perceived inability to cope with mundane problems like housing,
sewerage, potable water supply, and garbage collection further
weakens already strained regime legitimacy. Second, the process of
migration from rural to urban areas has always been a disorienting
process for many migrants. Whether in Ayachuco or Asyut, the mix of
rural-urban migration with discontented provincial intellectuals has
proved highly toxic (but, so far, not fatal) to existing governments.
The disoriented, recently arrived rural migrants to cities provide
fertile fishing ground for Islamic militants, particularly when the
(allegedly) decadent mores of the cities shock the sensibilities of
recently arrived migrants. The problems are also made more acute
by the difficulties which migrants sometimes find in obtaining
work (e.g., in the Maghreb). Third, urban discontent is clearly more
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Country

Percent
59.5
45.0
61.1
73.6
89.3
55.3
36.5
85.1
35.1
54.0
64.8
74.1
24.5

Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
Yemen

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001. NY: Oxford University Press,
pp. 154-157.

Table 4. Urban Population as Percent of Total Population, 1999,
in Selected Middle Eastern and North African Countries.
politically volatile and dangerous to regimes than is rural discontent
in the region. Rapid urbanization strains budgets, legitimacy, and
governance, while swelling the ranks of regime opponents.
Consider the example of Karachi. This city had one million
inhabitants at the time of independence, but now holds at least
11 million people, and will grow to perhaps 20 million by 2015.
The managers of such cities are completely overwhelmed. The
systems providing water, electricity, transportation, health care, and
education are all swamped. Meanwhile, the one place in the slums
which is cool while the outside is hot, the one place which is clean
while the outside is filthy, the one place which is calm where outside
is only chaos―is the mosque. Government policy has played an
important role here: government incapacity, and the “abandonment
of public space” to private, Islamist schools, clinics, hospitals, and
welfare agencies, have done much to advance the fanatics’ cause
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Some analysts, such as Gilles Kepel, see reasons to be hopeful.36
He contends that the social disorientation of the first generation of
rural migrants to the cities fueled much of the appeal of radical and
other Islamist movements. Stating that this process is decelerating,
he therefore argues that this particular root of radicalism is likely to
shrivel over time. This contention has much to recommend it, but
unless the above arguments on how dysfunctional urbanization
helps radicals is wrong, the deceleration of rural to urban migration
(which itself is not a foregone conclusion in all countries (see Table
4), is unlikely to be sufficient to undermine their appeal in the cities.
“But the September 11 Terrorists Were All Privileged!”
A number of observers37 have objected that, so far as we can tell,
most of the criminals of September 11 were privileged and educated.
Krueger and Maleckova conduct a regression analysis of arrested
Palestinians using income and education data, and conclude that
“poverty does not cause terrorism”―that is, the arrested youth are
neither relatively poor nor uneducated. There are two problems
with inferences from such findings. First, it is far from clear that
a similar result would obtain in, say, Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, or
Uzbekistan. Second, the research asks the wrong question (“Are
terrorists uneducated and/or poor?”), and, therefore, unsurprisingly
yields uninteresting answers. The real question, “How does poverty
contribute to Islamic radicalism,” requires a more nuanced analytical
approach.
The social problems sketched above, including poverty,
contribute to the existence of Islamic radicalism in several ways.
In the first place, we should remember the famous quip of George
Orwell: “Revolutionaries can always pronounce their aitches.”
Revolutionaries are often, even typically, from relatively privileged
backgrounds. Lenin was no muzhik. Mao tse-tung was the son of
a rich peasant. Yet the conditions of Russia and China in their
respective youths profoundly shaped their perspectives. People
who knew Mohammed Atta in Germany heard him speak of the “fat
cats” running Egypt. Most people find the presence of widespread
poverty and human degradation offensive. We are thinking,
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reasoning beings: we look around us, and then draw our own
conclusions. The presence of widespread socio-economic dislocation
delegitimizes regimes in the eyes of those who spend much of their
time thinking about what they see, such as intellectuals, journalists,
and students. It is entirely unsurprising that the “shock troops” of a
revolutionary movement are educated and privileged. It would be
quite a-historical to argue that their existence―and their appeal―is
independent of the social conditions of their societies.
It is also worth remembering that the phenomenon of Islamist
radicalism is far wider than al-Qaeda. Movements in Algeria,
Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen, Central Asia, and Southeast
Asia include many diverse actors. Indeed, Gilles Kepel’s optimistic
account38 is fundamentally a story of the alliances―and cleavages―
between two large social groups, the disenfranchised urban poor
and the “devout middle classes.” He argues that, although the poor
are drawn to Islamist politicians, the latter have been able to seize
power only when they could forge such an alliance (as during the
Iranian revolution). I would argue that, beyond such alliances, the
continued presence of societal distress on the scale evident in the
region, contributes to (note that the verb is not “cause”) the continued
appeal of Islamist radicals, not only among the poor but also among
the “lumpen intelligentsia” of unemployed middle-class high school
and university graduates. Monocausal explanations of complex
historical phenomenon are always foolish. This hardly means that
socio-economic conditions are irrelevant to their genesis.
A Historical Analogy.
An historical analogy may be illuminating here. The fanatics of
al-Qaeda display a family resemblance to the so-called “Nihilists”
and other terror-prone would-be revolutionaries of 19th century
Russia, as described by the Hungarian writer Tibor Szamuely:
The Russian intelligentsia was a social stratum composed of
those politically aroused, vociferous, and radical members of
the educated classes who felt totally estranged from society . . .
The alienation of the intelligentsia from society was to a great
extent inherent in the country’s rudimentary social structure . . .
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unlike the West, Russia had no interest groups capable of giving
strength, support and substance to the intellectuals’ protest . . .
The Russian intelligentsia had neither a place nor a stake in the
existing order of things.39

The author goes on to argue that, just as the educated young
men who piloted planes into the World Trade Center could easily
have found well-paying jobs, there were considerable opportunities
within the Tsarist burearucracy for men of talent in the Russian
Empire. But, like the al-Qaeda mujahidiin, many Russian intellectuals
chose to spurn this path: “The intelligent . . . himself rejected the idea
of serving a system founded on injustice, oppression and misery.”40
That is, ideas matter―and ideas are not formed in a socio-economic
vacuum.
Further similarities emerge. For example, in Russia during this
period, as during the past generation in the Middle East and wider
Muslim world, there was a dramatic expansion of the universities,
whose doors opened for the first time to relatively less privileged
young men, often from rural backgrounds.
(After the Crimean War) there was a marked shift in the social
composition of the student body in the universities . . . it came to
be made up more and more of so-called raznochintsy, “people of
diverse rank”: sons of clergymen, peasants, petty officials, army
officers, artisans, tradesmen who had become divorced by virtue
of their education or inclination from their fathers’ social station
and could no longer fit into the official estate system.41

In a manner which Szamuely finds “very understandable,”
instead of being grateful for this opportunity for upward mobility,
the “student-raznochinets brought with him a deep sense of the
injustices of Russian life . . . [which] rapidly turned into hatred of the
existing order.”42 Szamuely also notes that the intolerant utopianism
of the student revolutionaries was a mirror-image of the violence
of the Tsarist state. Here, too, there are important parallels with the
current situation in many Muslim countries.
The Failure of Governments.
The incompetence and authoritarianism of many Muslim and
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Middle Eastern governments strongly fosters Islamist radicalism. These
governments are overwhelmingly unelected, unaccountable, and corrupt;
they provide no legitimate outlet for youth discontent. Unsurprisingly,
these governments are widely despised by their young people. The
old ideologies of these governments, largely varieties of nationalism,
are also perceived as failures. The old ideology has failed to deliver
material goods or a sense of dignity either at home or abroad. The
half-century failure of Arab states to resolve the Palestinian situation
and the inability of Pakistan to ease the lot of Kashmiri Muslims
have contributed to the evident corrosion of regimes’ legitimacy
in the eyes of youth. Nationalism has not disappeared; it has been
assimilated into the Islamists’ discourse. And, as George Orwell once
said, “the nationalism of defeated peoples is necessarily revengeful
and short-sighted.”
Governments are rightly faulted for countries’ dismal economic
performance. During the past 20 years, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have seen their per
capita incomes rise at some 1.4 percent per year. East Asia (excluding
Japan) has, of course, grown much faster, at 5.8 percent per year, a
rate which doubled per capita incomes in 12 and 1/2 years. Even
Latin America, with its notorious “lost decade” of the debt-ridden
1980s, saw per capita incomes rise at just under 1 percent per year
during the past 2 decades. By contrast, per capita incomes in the
Arab states today are little different from what they were in 1980;
some analysts would argue that per capita growth has actually been
negative,43 which is clearly the case for some countries, notably the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Real wages and labor productivity today
are about the same as in 1970. This performance is worse than that
of any other major region of the world except for the countries of the
former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa.
The reasons for this woeful record are well-understood. A baleful
combination of vast economic rents, authoritarian and centralizing
states, and the fashion for import-substitution of the third quarter
of the 20th century generated inward-looking political economies
dominated by the state. Oil wealth has rendered the public purse
independent of taxation of the populace: no representation has
been fostered by no taxation. Because oil money flows directly into
the public purse, it fosters corruption. The role of the state in the
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economy was―and remains―unusually large, whether measured by
percentage of output or employment. (See Figure 2.) Dismantling
such inherited structures has proved difficult, and the process of
economic reform has often been tentative, dilatory, and slow.
Sluggish reform combined with continued regional conflict and
uncertainty have undermined private investment, whether of locals
or of foreigners. Consequently, the demand for labor has grown
slowly, while, as we have seen, the supply has soared. Government
economic policy failure is the other “blade of the scissors” producing
unemployment, falling real wages, stagnant per capita incomes.
What Is To Be Done?
How can we reduce the appeal of utopian fanatics? We should

Figure 2.
26

approach this problem with considerable humility. Take the economic
crisis. A strong case can be made that Middle Eastern economies have
failed, thanks to institutional―and political―deficiencies. Outsiders
can do very little to promote institutional change, as the United States
learned to its dismay, in Russia and elsewhere. Similarly, resolving
the deep cultural crisis of contemporary Islam’s confrontation with
modernity can only be done by Muslims. Non-Muslim Americans
are largely by-standers in this process, as well.
Take the problems of the economy. The region has been slow to
embrace the international consensus (the “Washington Consensus”)
on what economic policies ought to be adopted to improve economic
management, and thereby to restore growth of incomes and job
creation. This view holds that only a private-sector led, exportoriented economic development strategy has a chance of coping
with the development challenges facing the region. This consensus
is best articulated by the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF),44 but it has many other adherents, particularly in the
U.S. Government and in American academia and think-tanks.
The usual policy recommendation is to push harder for Middle
Eastern regimes to “reform their economies.” However, there
are reasons to fear that, although the Washington consensus has
virtues, it, too, is likely to fail. This is especially so for two groups of
countries, the very poor nations and the relatively rich states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
For the poorest countries, exports are highly unlikely to provide
either adequate food security (which is an increasingly serious
problem, given population growth and water constraints)45 or
sufficient numbers of jobs. At the same time, while domestic
productive capacity has been and is being damaged by population
growth and property rights issues (e.g., for groundwater); natural
resource degradation may have gone so far as to be very difficult
to reverse. Note that the enthusiasm for private market solutions is
unlikely to be very helpful when severe negative externalities exist.
Further, thanks to past population growth, the labor force is growing
so rapidly that provision of sufficient jobs via the “private sector-led
export model” is simply not credible: infrastructure is far too poor,
and the labor force is overwhelmingly illiterate. The grim facts are
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that, at best, economic development in such countries is mainly a
“holding action,” designed to prevent further deterioration and the
consequent complete breakdown of order. In addition to the human
suffering such breakdowns always bring, the danger, of course, is
that the anarchy of a Somalia or Afghanistan provides excellent
havens for terrorists and other organized criminals.
Nor does the Washington consensus easily fit the GCC states.
The problems here are, in the first instance, largely fiscal. The relief
which the last several years have afforded seems unlikely to last:
the “rent ceiling,” given by alternative energy production costs, is
perhaps about $25 per barrel. Even at this maximum (and relatively
unlikely) price, revenue would be short. The imperatives of
spending have (at least) three proximate causes: the perceived need
to spend heavily on 1) defense, 2) consumer subsidies, and 3) public
sector job creation. The GCC states have local populations which
completely depend upon, and expect to receive, a wide variety of
consumer subsidies. Governments’ ability to meet their side of the
social contract is increasingly in doubt. Most importantly, the large
majority (e.g., in Kuwait, ~ 80 percent) of nationals are employed by
the state. Consequently, shortfalls in government revenue translate
quickly into difficulties with employment creation. The need for job
creation is particularly acute, given the weakness of a “demographic
transition” in the GCC states: mortality rates have fallen sharply, but
fertility rates have fallen only very moderately and remain very high
by international standards. (See Table 1.) High rates of population
growth 15-20 years ago translate into very rapidly growing labor
supplies today. The private sector cannot currently take up the
slack in employment creation. The sector is too dependent on
state largesse, and relatively too small to do so. Most importantly,
however, the countries of the Gulf have limited comparative advantages
in non-oil goods or services. Wage rates, seriously inflated by past oil
rents and current consumer subsidies, are far too high to compete
in low wage activities, but skills are too low to compete in more
sophisticated activities.
The orthodox economic growth strategy also faces formidable
obstacles in other countries of the region where the strategy might
more plausibly work, in the so-called Newly Industrializing
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Countries (NICs), like the North African countries, Egypt, Iran,
and, possibly, Jordan. Here the needed policy shifts may themselves
be destabilizing, not only because the necessary changes involve
austerity, but also because special interests which are major props
of regime support―and who occupy important subsidized positions
within the bureaucracy―face important challenges. Examples of the
latter range from East Bank Jordanians to Egyptian workers in stateowned enterprises.
Over the longer haul, the needed changes are also likely to
be destabilizing in another way: attracting the necessary volume
of investment in the region will almost certainly require greater
governmental accountability and more transparent rules of the
economic game. This is not to say that democracy is needed for
growth; it is merely to suggest that it is very unlikely that regimes
will attract the necessary private capital from their own citizens or
from foreigners if regimes persist in their arbitrary, authoritarian
practices. Since there are good reasons to suppose that continued
authoritarianism is, in itself, one of the roots of Islamic radicalism46, and
since continued unaccountable governance undermines economic
growth, institutional change in the direction of greater participation
and enhanced governmental accountability is almost certainly
necessary if the countries of the region are to achieve stability in the
longer term.
The problem, of course, is that managing the transition from the
current situation of authoritarian unaccountability is likely to be
rocky―and destabilizing. what are you up to? Inevitably there will
be failures as well as successes. Given recent history, it should be
obvious that even relatively successful regimes may well be hostile
to many U.S. foreign policies. Much hypocrisy has poisoned public
debate on these issues in the United States: we are simultaneously
told that 1) the “Arab street” doesn’t matter, and 2) regimes are
actually in favor of our overthrowing the government of Iraq, but
they can’t say so publicly. The inconsistency here seems to bother
few observers. To paraphrase that darling of the neo-conservatives,
Winston Churchill, more democratic regimes in the region are likely
to be the worst of all possible outcomes―except for all the others.
Humility, of course, would help. The truth is that outsiders are
largely irrelevant to the process of deep institutional and cultural
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change which, alone, can ultimately overcome the profound, multitiered crisis facing the Muslim world. Our attempts to promote
democracy in the former Soviet Union ran squarely against the
burden of Russian, Caucasian, and Central Asian history.
Of course, it is within our power to refrain from making things
worse. We can, indeed must, avoid actions which provide arguments
to the fanatics, and which discourage those Middle Easterners who
would respond differently to the crises facing their societies. Here, of
course, our foreign policy plays a vital role. We must press on with
seeking a settlement to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
The sorry legacy of the past 2 years (not to say the last century) means
that any resolution will be, to say the least, enormously difficult.
Time may be running out for the only viable solution, a two-state
solution. Whatever the difficulties, we have no choice but to try. Any
seasoned observer of the region knows that it is entirely impossible
for the United States to have peace with young Arabs and other
Muslims until this situation is resolved. We also have opportunities
to contribute to change through modifying our policies toward the
Gulf and, perhaps especially, toward Iran. Our energy policies also
remain stunningly myopic, as we continue to “pay at the pump” for
many a Salafi madrasa.
Unfortunately, current indications are that our policies will
do little to ameliorate these problems. A dismaying tendency in
the current American discourse is to attribute the entirety of the
problem to cultural failings in the Muslim world, and to argue that
the problems have a largely military solution. The above analysis
suggests that this is most unlikely to be true.47 Instead of formulating
a nuanced policy, combining short-term covert operations against
al-Qaeda with medium- to long-run strategies to undermine the
appeal of violent Islamist radicals, the Bush administration has
adopted a policy which myopically focuses on unilateral military
action. Now that we have destroyed the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, we
face a dilemma: if we withdraw too quickly, we risk plunging the
country into chaos, but if we stay too long, we risk being perceived
as colonialists. Falling into either trap would further undermine our
standing in the Muslim world. Perhaps we will be both lucky and
very skillful (we will need both). Unfortunately, there is a grave risk
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of our actions stoking the already intense rage against the United
States felt by the political actors to whom the future belongs: young
Muslims. Sadly, as of this writing, it seems probable that both
American behavior and regional trends will continue to nourish the
roots of Islamist radicalism.
Summary of Policy Recommendations.
• Recognize that our past policies have contributed to the origins
of this problem. Understand that denial of history does not serve
our interests.
• Recognize that the necessary institutional changes must come
from within Arab and other Muslim societies. Learn from the
failure of “shock-therapy” in the former Soviet Union.
• Subject all policies to the “youth test”―ask: “Could this policy
further enrage young Muslims against us?”
• Move―now and forcefully―to create a viable, independent,
democratic Palestinian state.
• Understand that genuinely democratic Arab and Islamic polities
will include strong representation of Islamists. Accept that
although we will have our differences with many of these, we
can often still work with all except the jihadist salafis (see list on
page 3).
• Adopt domestic energy policies designed to speed the transition
to the “post-oil era.”
• Work closely with the EU on all Middle Eastern issues. (What
would we think if the EU pursued policies in Latin America that
ignored our interests?)
• Do everything possible to strengthen intelligence and police
cooperation with Arab, EU, and other governments in the struggle
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against al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadi salafist terrorists.
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